Track all of the global protest activity taking place on International Workers’ Day (or May Day or Labor Day depending on your location) including plans to reignite the “Occupy” movement.

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The UN Security Council approved a no-fly zone and air strikes over Libya late last week, and in a previous blog post on February 23rd we noted, “the prospect of civil war or foreign intervention seems far more likely than Gaddafi stepping down.” Both of these outcomes are now reality as the Security Council voted 10-0 in favor of implementing the measure with five members abstaining. Media attention is largely focused on the air strikes, but the fact that five members of the council abstained from voting was mostly overlooked.

Why did these nations abstain from a vote? The explanation given by the BBC suggests ”Russia and China -which often oppose the use of force against a sovereign country as they believe it sets a dangerous precedent -abstained rather than using their power of veto as permanent members.” Why do these nations believe it may set a dangerous precedent? What internal concerns do these nations have? Open source intelligence tools can reveal interesting quotations linked to political events and actors to help solve critical international relations questions.

In this example, we will focus on the political interaction of Russia vis-a-vis the international community. We will then contrast Russia’s official statements at the UN with its domestic rhetoric. Are they similar or different? First, we need to gain a better understanding of the current Russian political situation.

Real Time Timeline of the Russian opposition movement

From the graph we see that there is a considerable democratic opposition movement in Russia. This movement has been gaining momentum and has been in the news lately:

• In early January, the Russian government jailed one of the most prominent opposition leaders, Boris Nemstov, along with 19 others in Moscow.

• A New York Times article describes the “rare bow to popular pressure”the Kremlin made to pacify opposition leaders in the region of Kaliningrad. The Russian government decided not to back Georgy V. Boos, an unpopular governor in the region. His reappointment was expected to spark some of the most intense protests in recent history.

• 500 pro-democracy demonstrators rallied in Moscow with the permission of the Russian government following the unrest in Egypt

The Kremlin is generally hostile to any form of protest, but occasionally makes concessions to pro-democracy ethnic Russians. The replacement of Georgy V. Boos is one such example. Still, the unrest in the Middle East has visibly rattled Moscow, and the United Russia Party in recent months has bent more than normal. Protest permits are generally denied in Moscow, but Boris Nemstov was granted permission to protest in late January. So why the recent change in policy?

The elephant in the room for the Russian government is the Muslim population in the North Caucasus region. Over the past twenty years, the government has fought two terrible wars against separatists in the North Caucasus. Both sides committed their fair share of atrocities leaving hundreds of thousands dead, and they essentially remain at war.

The Russian government is afraid of the unrest in the Middle East spreading to the North Caucasus:

Timeline of Medvedev quotes related to the Middle East

• In the timeline above are a number of Dimitri Medvedev quotations on links between the unrest in the Middle East and the North Caucasus. This comes from the Moscow Times and bluntly states that, “Medvedev eyes Middle East link in North Caucasus”.

• In another article, the President of Russia explains that, “the situation in the Middle East may lead to the disintegration of major nations into small bits, the rise to power of fanatics and the spread of extremism for decades to come…They were preparing such a scenario for us before and will now try even more to make it happen”. Medvedev is referring to the Chechen militants in this case as the “fanatics” and to the “disintegration of major nations into smaller bits” as the goal of the Chechen separatist movement.

Medvedev may be correct on the stated goal of the Chechen resistance, but the likelihood of pro-democracy resistance spreading to Chechnya seems unlikely. The Russian President’s more realistic concern may be general unrest as seen in the Middle East taking hold in the North Caucasus.

The most interesting point that Recorded Future’s timeline tool uncovered was that Nashi openly supports Colonel Gaddafi. Nashi is the primary youth organization of Vladamir Putin’s United Russia Party and has the firm backing of the Kremlin. It is a bit shocking to read the statements of Boris Yakemenko, a high-ranking ideologist in Nashi: “Libyan leader Col. M. Gaddafi has shown the whole world how to treat provocateurs who aim for revolution, destabilization, and civil war.”

Yakemenko wrote the statement in an essay entitled “The Right Path,” posted on his blog and on Nashi’s official website. These statements of support for Gaddafi are coming from the main youth wing supported by the Russian government. Considering this, how close was Russia to actually using its veto power on the Security Council?

Conclusion

The Russian government believes that foreign intervention in Libya would set a “dangerous precedent” for encroaching on the territory of sovereign states. Using open source analysis we have unraveled some of the facts behind this statement. Evidence suggests that the Russian government is afraid that the unrest in the Middle East will spread to the North Caucasus. In that case, the Russian government would be forced to suppress the Chechen resistance once again. In regard to the UN Security Council, Russia and China would prefer not to have it looking into their own internal security problems.

As of March 9th, oil prices were $104 per barrel and the “market sentiment [was] dominated by concern over unrest in the Middle East”. The financial industry is concerned about events in the Middle East, and market uncertainty has driven up prices up. How can investors and the public navigate this uncertainty? The answer is a combination of international relations logic and open source intelligence.

There is a recurring narrative to the protests in the Middle East, and one of the dominant factors in determining political outcomes is the relationship between the military and the people. On this blog, we’ve analyzed the relationship in Egypt, Libya, and Iran. However, knowledge of the international system alone is not enough to make reasonable predictions. OSINT tools like Recorded Future provide the “meat and potatoes” of the analysis that can support or refute a hypothesis.

In Egypt, intelligence suggested stability because of a fairly close relationship between the people and the military whereas civil war seemed likely in Libya because of clan rivalry. In Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei was likely to brutally oppress the opposition and face little resistance while March 9th, the Washington Post published an article outlining Saudi Arabia’s likely stability. Thus far, these hypotheses have largely held despite a rapidly changing security situation.

OSINT Process

What is the process of open source intelligence gathering? How can one use Recorded Future to make reasonable predictions about political events?

The first step is to pick a topic of interest. In this scenario we will use the Kingdom of Bahrain. The tiny island nation has been in the news as King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa clings to power despite sizable democracy protests. The situation in Bahrain is important to the region for geopolitical, religious, and security reasons.

The Saudi government has been watching its neighbor particularly closely as the Shiite majority in Bahrain is demanding reforms similar to calls for protest in Saudi Arabia. Another fear is that hundreds of thousands fleeing Bahrain over the King Fahd Causeway could cause a refugee crisis.

The next step in our analysis is to gather some basic information about the relationship between the military and people in Bahrain. We will use this information to formulate a hypothesis about political outcomes.

News coverage suggests that the military is loyal to King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and fired on protesters. Important to consider as recent events show continued stability for military-backed governments although there are complicating religious factors that make Bahrain harder to predict.

What news items support or refute the hypothesis of a stable Bahrain? Let’s gather some intelligence.

Timeline of Bahrain Protests

Above is a timeline of the protests in Bahrain, from when they first began to gain momentum in mid-February until now. Some items of note include the following:

• The Shiite opposition has effectively left the government. This establishes that opposition groups exist in Bahrain and were members of parliament. Even more substantial, the majority of the populace in Bahrain is Shiite although the ruling family is Sunni. This religious difference could stir sectarian conflict in Bahrain.

• The King decided to release some political prisoners. This shows that King Al Khalifa is at least aware of the protests and has been willing to make marginal concessions. He is certainly more responsive than Colonel Gaddafi.

• The momentum of the protests tanked after February 17th, around the time when several protesters were killed. It appears that the people did not continue mass protests in the face of a government crackdown. Protests may still be ongoing, but they are not nearly at the levels they were in mid-February.

The protests in Bahrain appeared to be vicious in mid-February. So where did they go? What did King Al Khalifa say during this period?

Overview of Al Khalifa's Statements

• Al Khalifa offered concessions that may have appeased at least some of the opposition. He expressed condolences on state TV for the two protesters that were killed and offered cash payouts of $2,500 to every local family. He also pledged an investigation into the killings.

• It seems that there is a stalemate in Bahrain. The opposition groups have pulled out, but the King stated that he would open a dialogue. The Shiite opposition groups have refused to talk until the government resigns.

Timeline of Al Khalifa's Statements and Concessions

One article that Recorded Future’s timeline tool uncovered was a New York Times article on the role of the military in Arab governments. It talks in detail about the relationship between the military and the people in Egypt and Bahrain. The author notes, “as in nearly all police states, the key to change lies with the military.” In contrast to Egypt, “the military [in Bahrain] seems to have concluded that adapting to change would do them no good — that the protesters were far too great a threat to their very command of society,”

Final Analysis

The primary factor supporting the stability hypothesis is that the military in Bahrain firmly supports King Al Khalifa. The bedrock of stability in a police state is the military, and with control of this apparatus King Al Khalifa has the advantage. Another reason to support the stability hypothesis is that the momentum of the protests has largely faded. The opposition does not appear to be as strong as it was in mid-February.

However, the fact that the majority Shiite opposition has withdrawn from the government and is refusing to talk is troubling. The fact that the Al Khalifa government is minority Sunni and the people are majority Shiite could raise the specter of sectarian conflict. An influx of arms from another actor in the region could change the balance of power rather quickly.

Interested in conducting similar analysis or leveraging our news analytic data for OSINT? Contact our Federal Team today!

There is growing concern that unrest in the Middle East may spread to Saudi Arabia. As the world’s largest oil exporter, its importance to the international market is unquestionable, and protests in neighboring Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen have been of particular concern to King Abdullah.

In an effort to head off any ripples of unrest, public protest has been banned while social concessions have been made including the increase of government salaries by 15% and the investment of $36 billion in a new financial aid and development package. Still, foreign investors worry this may not be enough.

What do we know about the situation in Saudi Arabia? What open source data may prove useful? How is Iran working to manipulate the situation?

Protests in Saudi Arabia are reportedly planned for March 11th and 20th with expected turnout to be around 17,000. However, this number is rather small compared to the number of protesters seen in similar “Day of Rage” events across the Middle East. If any political momentum is to be gained by these protest groups, it will be on either of those days, and one can expect Saudi Arabia to gain even more news momentum in the run up to protests.

Rest of the Week for Saudi Arabia (from 3/7) - Click for Live Timeline

Interestingly, the Iranian government has mounted a media campaign to hype the Saudi protests. A regular Google search for “Saudi Arabia protests” turns up much describing the dissenters and their actions. Using Recorded Future’s OSINT tools, we find that Iran’s Press TV came out with the following headline: “Massive protests loom in Saudi Arabia.”

This report lies in stark contrast to the general media consensus of the protest situation in Saudi Arabia, which is depicted as moderate at worst and really takes a backseat to commentary on already imperiled Egypt and Libya.

Recent Quotations and Political Events on Saudi Arabia - Click for Live View

Press TV has exaggerated the situation in Saudi Arabia, and coincidentally, is funded by the Iranian government. The channel disputed the killing of Neda Agha-Soltan by Iranian security forces and was accused of crushing dissent regarding the Iranian elections.

Protests in Saudi Arabia have thus far been described as minimal and “not nearly on the scale seen in other areas of the Middle East and North Africa.”

Timeline of Saudi Protests

King Abdullah’s popularity among the Saudi people has also been understated. Indeed, he enjoys one of the highest approval ratings in the Middle East, and Prince Talal bin Abdul-Aziz, considered an outsider to the royal family, recently echoed King Abdullah’s domestic appeal saying, “[King Abdullah] is not merely liked, but he is loved by the people“.

In an analysis of the situation in Saudi Arabia, the Director of Research for the Saudi-U.S. Trade Group Lucien Ziegler listed similar reasons explaining Saudi Arabi’s likely stability.

This does not mean that the situation in Saudi Arabia could not escalate, and King Abdullah is clearly aware of the dissent he is facing given appeasement efforts. The balance of power remains in King Abdullah’s favor, but if protests become as violent as demonstrations in Bahrain then the game. Security forces have already been drafted for crackdown on March 11th if protests reach a certain point.

Final Analysis

Large-scale political unrest in Saudi Arabia is less likely than in Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya. One major factor is that political parties are banned in Saudi Arabia and therefore few opposition groups exist. There has been little talk in the press of opposition groups, even ones that may exist underground. Further, Saudi Arabia has only a minimal history of violent political protest.

In contrast, one factor that may escalate violence is Saudi Arabia’s large population of unemployed youth. This combined with an increasingly vocal Shia minority may prove to be a challenge to the House of Saud.

What does seem likely is that Iran will continue to play up any protests in Saudi Arabia through media bias. Most of the political protests on Friday will come from the Shia-dominated regions, and Iran may attempt to fan this unrest. Based on our findings, this process is already underway.