The Middle Eastern powder keg has exploded. Over the past month, protests have rocked a laundry list of countries including Libya, Bahrain, Iran, Egypt, and Tunisia. A pan-Arab youth movement has so far forced two dictators to step down (Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarek) and is turning the most volatile region in the world on its head.
With so many governments in peril the news media, and the government has had trouble keeping up with the protests. Coverage may bounce between three or more countries over the course of a day. What country should everyone be watching? The answer: Iran.
Why is Iran so important to understanding the future of the Middle East? As the largest financier of state sponsored terrorism, Iran wields considerable power over political outcomes in the region. It spends millions of dollars each year supporting terrorist organizations that foment violence and seek to disrupt Arab governments. The Islamic Republic is by far the greatest threat to stability in the Middle East.
In order for us to draw broader conclusions about what may happen in the Middle East, we must first analyze the posture of Iran. Who really governs the Islamic Republic? What is the country’s political and economic outlook? Are the Green Movement’s protests likely to be successful?
Using Recorded Future’s open source intelligence tools, we can deep dive into the political structure of Iran and discover new information about the future of the regime.
Political Structure
The problem that Iran poses for political scientists is that no one really knows who governs it. Our best guess is that real power is divided between the Supreme Leader of Iran, the Guardian Council, and the Revolutionary Guards. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, directly appoints members to the Guardian Council and essentially maintains veto power over all aspects of the government. Thus, Ayatollah Khamenei is at the apex of this complex governing apparatus.
To fully understand the motivations of Iran, we must examine the intentions, statements, and travel patterns of its most powerful figurehead.
Here we see that Ayatollah Khamenei is the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that he is linked to the country’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Further, news articles have highlighted his opposition to Israel, the UK, and the United States. More importantly, what are his political relationships inside Iran? Who may pose the greatest internal threat to the regime?
Examining Khamenei’s personal feuds and social links, we can draw some insights into Iranian politics. In the upper right portion of the diagram are two of Khamenei’s staunchest supporters (Alamolhoda and Jannati). Jannati at one point even called for opposition executions to be sped up after the 2009 protests. In the bottom portion of the diagram are two of Khamenei’s critics, Rafsanjani and Montazeri. Rafsanjani particularly troubles the ultra-conservative regime as he contested Ahmadinejad in an election and is a former moderate president. If Ahmadinejad’s government were to crumble in the face of oppositional protest, Rafsanjani would likely play a critical role in a transitional government.
Economic and Political Outlook
The Iranian regime is in considerable political and economic trouble. For years it has supported terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hizballah to fight proxy wars against Israel.
However, in January 2010 it was reported that the regime had slashed Hizballah’s budget by up to 40%. This indicates that Iran’s ability to financially support terrorist organizations may be dwindling.
Over the past few years the Iranian state has experienced significant economic difficulties. It has relied extensively on subsidies to maintain prices and secure political support. According to NPR, Iran’s currency is weak and its banking system is shaky. This does not bode well for the Iranian regime.
Most troubling of all for Ahmadinejad’s government is that Iran ranks #32 on Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index, a measure of the overall sustainability of a state. Iran’s ranking has increased in recent years, jumping 25 positions and moving from “Borderline” to “In Danger” during the period 2007-2010. A change of this magnitude is considerable.
The ultra-conservatives are also facing considerable political opposition, both from outside and occasionally within the regime itself. In a rare outburst, the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association reported that Khamenei’s representative, Hassan Rowhani, criticized Ahmadinejad for “maladministration and squandering Iran’s wealth”. Although Khamenei supports the hard-line Ahmadinejad, that does not mean that he could not change his support sometime in the future.
Travel Patterns of Ayatollah Khamenei
Khamenei seems to travel very little. There is evidence of him traveling to different cities within Iran, including Qom, but rarely outside of Iran. This may indicate that he is either afraid of assassination or of losing control during his absence like the Shah did in 1979. Khamenei is acutely aware of his country’s failing economy and mounting political unrest. He wants to stay in Iran and consolidate his power over the regime. This lack of travel also indicates that he is probably afraid of losing power.
States that are weak often resort to brutal tactics to quash unrest, and unfortunately they are often successful. The Iranian regime used domestic security forces to crush the Green Movement in 2009. It also appears that Khamenei may have been afraid of losing power.
Using Recorded Future’s ability to find articles of interest linked to Khamenei’s travels patterns, we discover that Khamenei may have been planning to flee to Russia if the opposition movement increased:
Although the authenticity of the article has been questioned, it is in line with some other facts. For instance, Khamenei travels very little outside of the country, preferring to send Ahmadinajad to conduct foreign policy abroad. The Russian government has some ties to the Iranian regime (other than being close geographically) and has been reluctant to sanction Iran. Khamenei is probably afraid of losing power, and this may have reached a climax during the 2009 protests.
Conclusion
The Iranian regime is in trouble and Ayatollah Khamenei knows it. A failing economy and popular domestic unrest pose significant threats to the regime. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is unlikely to be overthrown in the short term. The Revolutionary Guards are strong and intensely loyal to the regime- enough so to kill their own people. We did not see this happen in Egypt because of a secular military that supported the people. Khamenei is likely to retain control of Iran because of a strong security force that has more power and motivation than the Green Movement.
The good news is that Iran’s ability to finance terror organizations is waning. The Iranian economy is sputtering and this should have an impact on its ability to influence Middle Eastern politics.








February 21st, 2011 on 9:36 am
Interesting and well sourced article. But where did you get the “open intel” on Iran financing terrorism in the billions? The links to Hizbullah are only assumed and not “supported” by your platform, as for the ones for the Hamas are a bit clearer (ie links to Gaza and West Bank) but not mentionned in the article.
February 21st, 2011 on 1:35 pm
The article discussing Iran slashing Hizballah’s budget can be found here:
http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=199611
The article notes that, “Iran has in recent years provided Hizbullah with close to $1 billion in direct military aid”.
More information regarding Iran’s links to terrorist groups can be found here:
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm
Of particular interest is the following:
“The Qods Force provided aid in the form of weapons, training, and funding to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq-based militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.”
February 21st, 2011 on 3:17 pm
Interesting article however there are too many assumptions and speculations and little concrete facts.
For example: The reason for Iran to decrease it’s support of Hizbollah could be as simple as Hizbollah being able to produce it’s own resources and not needing to rely on Iran as much. The general secretary Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah has already hinted at this in one of his speeches.
Further what is defined as terrorism in the West/US is often considered as holy resistance in the Middle East. Both democratically elected Hamas and Hizbollah are examples of this which have the support of its own people which they are defending.
February 21st, 2011 on 8:35 pm
U.N. Resolution 1701 (http://bit.ly/fYssY3) bars Hizbollah from rearming and existing as an armed group:
“require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State”
Hizbollah lacks the support of the international community or the Lebanese government. Also, I cannot find any evidence to support your claim that Hizbollah is strong enough to “no longer need” Iranian support.
February 22nd, 2011 on 5:12 am
@r
That was not an assertion from my behalf, rather an suggestion that Iran’s cutting support does not necessarily mean due to the state of their economics.
March 29th, 2011 on 9:55 pm
The wave of revolution is blowing in the name of the Ayotollah of Iran. This is not good and we must be prepard to take up Arms to fight this regime who uses the Koran and the Phrophet Muhummad to justify their war crimes.